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  Given the profusion of papers on the financial crisis, the decision to write another 
requires some justification. I have accepted the commission for this one because it is 
designed to address an aspect of the problem that remains understudied, namely the 
design and coordination of global policy reforms. Scads have been written on reforming 
national financial markets. But the reach of financial markets and institutions is global. 
Although lip service has been paid to the need for global coordination of those national 
policies, progress remains halting. Whether in fact there will be a response justifying the 
label “global policy reforms” remains an open question. 
My analysis is in two parts corresponding to the two main explanations for the 
crisis.  The first explanation sees the crisis as rooted in inadequate regulation and 
distorted incentives in financial markets.  The second sees it as the result of a global 
savings glut that fueled an unsustainable credit boom in the United States.  The debate 
between these two viewpoints – not so much their validity as the weight to be attached to 
them – will be played out in the history books.  For present purposes I do not attempt to 
rank their importance.
2  I simply assume the validity of both explanations and, by 
                                                 
1 Prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s conference on Asia and the Financial Crisis, 
Santa Barbara, California, 19-21 October. 
2 For my views on this question see Eichengreen (2009a).   2
implication, their compatibility.  In each case I draw first the lessons of the crisis and then 
the implications for policy. 
 
National Financial Markets and Global Policy Reforms 
The first explanation for the crisis focuses on distorted incentives in financial 
markets and the failure of regulators to contain their effects.  Deregulation, as symbolized 
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the U.S. and the Single Market Act in Europe, 
allowed financial institutions to take on additional risk.  The resulting intensification of 
competition encouraged them to do so in response to the pressure to survive.  Risk taking 
was fueled by the knowledge that big banks were important for financial stability – that 
they stood to receive official assistance in the event of difficulties.  Compensation 
schemes for investment managers, whose bonuses depended on current performance 
irrespective of the future profitability or even viability of the firm, encouraged strategies 
that maximized short-term returns at the expense of long-term stability.  The originate-
and-distribute model of securitization allowed firms to neglect the long-term performance 
of the securities they issued since the originating entity had no skin in the game.  Rating 
agencies, lacking reliable models of delinquency probabilities on subprime mortgages in 
a down market, failed to warn of the risks.  As advisors on structuring securitizations as 
well as issuers of ratings, they faced conflicts of interest. 
Regulators, meanwhile, lacked the resources to keep up with the regulated.   They 
bought into the argument that the banks’ internal models provided reliable forecasts of 
value at risk and that improved ability to diversify, repackage and otherwise manage risk 
justified ever-lower capital ratios as necessary to minimize the costs of financial   3
intermediation.  The fragmented structure of regulation within and across countries meant 
that no single regulator possessed a comprehensive picture of the regulated.  The 
fragmentation of regulation also created scope for regulatory arbitrage – for bank and 
nonbank financial firms to shift risky activities both to more permissive jurisdictions and 
off-balance-sheet, where capital charges could be evaded.
3  
Policy Implications.  From this diagnosis flows a prescription.  First, regulators 
should require banks to hold more capital.  By giving bank shareholders something to 
lose, capital is a disincentive for excessive risk taking.  It is also a buffer against risks to 
the balance sheet.  Well-capitalized banks are less likely to be driven into insolvency by 
shocks.  They are less likely to lose the public confidence that is critical for the 
willingness of other market participants to do business with them.  They will be better 
placed to expand their balance sheets when investment opportunities arise. 
Against this backdrop it is striking that Tier 1 capital (banks’ core capital as 
defined in the Basel Capital Accord) has been trending steadily downward in the 
advanced economies in recent decades, reflecting the belief that lower capital 
requirements reduce the cost of financial services and that banks can safely manage their 
affairs from a narrow capital base.  The result is that Tier 1 capital in the United States 
has effectively gone negative in every recent recession.  The traditional response of 
regulatory forbearance to allow the banks to earn their way out of this hole becomes less 
                                                 
3 Given this litany of incentive problems, it is not hard to see how the world fell prey to a financial crisis.  
In retrospect the more appropriate question would seem: how could it have avoided one given these 
conditions?  All this might seem blindingly obvious in retrospect.  What is less obvious is why these 
problems were so inadequately appreciated before the fact. The failure of financial market participants to 
sound alarm bells is perhaps understandable, given that they were able to profit handsomely from 
exploiting incentives for risk taking and, in the words of Chuck Prince, to keep dancing so long as the 
music is playing.  The failure of the regulators to do more plausibly reflects intellectual regulatory capture 
– the tendency for regulators to buy into the worldview of the regulated.  For my money, the most troubling 
aspect is the failure of independent observers – including academics – to appreciate the prospective risks 
(Eichengreen 2009b).   4
feasible in an era of mark-to-market accounting.  Much higher Tier 1 capital requirements 
are the obvious answer. 
At the same time they adjust capital requirements upward, regulators can usefully 
revise them along a number of additional dimensions. Capital requirements should apply 
to the consolidated position of the institution whether investments are held on or off 
balance sheet.
4  Required capital ratios should be predicated on realistic holding periods.
5  
They should reflect not just the volatility of banks’ investments but also the volatility of 
their funding.  They should reflect the risk posed by failure of the individual institution to 
the stability of the financial system; from this flows the conclusion that more capital 
should be required of big banks and connected banks.  Required capital ratios should 
have a countercyclical influence; they should rise when a bank’s balance sheet is 
expanding, rather than falling because its internal model signals less value at risk or the 
rating agencies upgrade the securities on its portfolio. 
Second, there is the need for a resolution regime for systemically significant 
nondepository institutions (both banks and nonbanks) to create a third way between 
government assistance and uncontrolled bankruptcy.  A commitment not to extend a 
bailout will be time inconsistent in the absence of a resolution regime.  Auto companies 
can keep selling cars even while under bankruptcy protection.
6  But standard bankruptcy 
procedures are not feasible for financial institutions which require people to believe in 
their solvency in order to keep funding them.  In addition to the confidence problem there 
is the fact that putting a financial institution through bankruptcy can place derivatives 
                                                 
4 As Spanish regulators insisted prior to the crisis. 
5 Thus, capital requirements for asset backed securities have been predicted on the assumption of a ten-day 
trading horizon, which is patently unrealistic in many cases. 
6 At least if someone stands behind their warranties.   5
contracts in limbo, resulting in a domino effect destabilizing other institutions as claims 
are suspended and collateral is frozen.
7 
The very fact that the United States has the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
as an alternative to bankruptcy for banks is an indication that the country needs an 
equivalent resolution mechanism for bank holding companies.  But while we have the 
FDIC for banks like the old Citibank, we do not have the equivalent for bank holding 
companies like Citigroup.   Bank holding companies in the United States are regular 
corporations and are therefore subject to regular bankruptcy procedures that lack 
preemptive provisions.
8  The UK similarly has a special resolution regime for deposit 
banks as of 2009 but not for merchant banks and other nonbank financial institutions.  So 
long as this remains the case, moral hazard will be a problem, and potentially a serious 
one.
9 
                                                 
7 The Federal Deposit Insurance Act allows the FDIC, when resolving a bank, to transfer certain derivatives 
and other qualified financial contracts to third parties, eliminating this problem.  But not so the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code to which nondepository institutions are putatively subject.  For more on this see the 
immediately following paragraph. 
8 The Fed does have the power to require a bank holding company to divest its banks if it fails to meet 
minimum capital requirements, although the holding company normally has 180 days to complete the 
divertiture (Elliot 2009). 
9 The U.S. Treasury has proposed extending FDI-like resolution authority to bank holding companies and 
their subsidiaries but not to hedge funds, private equity firms, and other non-holding company financial 
entities.  Seizing, restructuring and re-privatizing a large bank holding company either as a unified whole or 
in parts is likely to be more complex than doing so for a depository institution, not just since bank holding 
companies are more complex but because each one is unique.  Banks should therefore be required to 
provide a roadmap for how this can be done.  Anil Kashyap, the Bank of England, and the Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation all suggest that bank holding companies should be required to plan their own 
funeral arrangements in advance; they should be required to draft a set of instructions for how their 
institutions could be quickly dismantled should the need arise.  See Kashyap (2009); Bank of England 
(2009); Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2009).  Providing regulators with a roadmap would 
give them an alternative to bailouts.  Reducing bailout incidence would in turn mitigate moral hazard.  In 
addition, having to sign off on their own funeral arrangements would focus the attention of managers and 
directors on the mortality of their institution.  It would deter them from taking on additional risks that made 
orderly unwinding more difficult – especially if banks whose own plans indicated that more days would be 
required for orderly resolution were required to hold commensurately more capital.   6
A resolution regime for these entities would have the following features.
10  The 
regulator would be empowered to appoint an administrator.  The administrator’s powers 
would include firing the management and board and suspending the voting and other 
decision rights of the shareholders and unsecured creditors.  The administrator could 
ring-fence specific activities (securities clearing, settlement and custodian activities) and 
instruments (derivative securities etc.).  He could transfer deposits to another bank, sell 
assets, and mandate debt-for-equity swaps, and finally break up the institution or order its 
liquidation. 
Third, supervisors must be provided with the information they need to make 
informed assessments of risks to stability.  This means not starving regulatory agencies of 
the resources required for information gathering.
11  It means imposing reporting 
requirements on hedge funds and other nonbank financial institutions of potential 
systemic significance, requiring them to provide information relevant to the regulator’s 
micro- and macro-prudential tasks.
12 
Fourth, regulators should address problems in markets for derivative securities.  
They should seek to better align the economic interests of originators and investors by 
requiring the originator of any securitized asset to retain a meaningful portion of the 
equity or first-loss tranche.  This will give the originator a stake in the subsequent 
performance of the issue.  The Treasury blueprint for reforming the U.S. financial system 
proposes that the originator should be required to hold five per cent of each issue.
13  It 
                                                 
10 More detailed discussion is in Cohen and Goldstein (2009). 
11 It means compensating their staffs appropriately.  The problem of bloodhounds and greyhounds is a 
perennial: the greyhounds (financial market participants) run very fast while the bloodhounds (their 
regulators) struggle to stay on the trail.  But a starvation diet does not help the bloodhounds keep pace. 
12 Confidentiality should be ensured, but this should not be something to lose sleep over insofar as reporting 
will be to the regulators, who can aggregate the information before releasing it. 
13 See U.S. Treasury (2009a).   7
can be argued that five per cent is not enough – that the originator’s skin should be 
thicker.  The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation argues the other way: it warns 
that such measures may result in greater concentration of risk for financial institutions.
14  
But , if so, then they should be accompanied by higher capital requirements.  This may 
make originating such securities more costly, but such as the price of a stable financial 
system. 
Further, regulators should move over-the-counter derivatives transactions into a 
clearinghouse where there exists a central counterparty.  The central counterparty is the 
single buyer and seller to every other party.  It collects margins on every trade and places 
them into a reserve fund to protect against losses if other parties default.  Traders only 
have to worry about the creditworthiness of this one counterparty.  If any single trader 
goes under, this is unlikely to create the kind of domino effect that resulted from the 
failure of Lehman Brothers.  Some derivative securities (such as interest rate swaps) are 
already central-counterparty cleared by LCH.Clearnet Ltd.  Credit default swaps based on 
indices have been cleared by Intercontinental Exchange’s CCP service since March.  The 
authorities in the U.S. and Europe have announced the intention of further expanding 
their use of central counterparties for clearing over-the-counter derivative products.  
Better still would be to move transactions onto an organized exchange whose members 
commit their capital jointly and separately to guarantee transactions.
15   
                                                 
14 Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2009), p.22. 
15 Related to the preceding, the authorities should encourage standardized derivative instruments that lend 
themselves to centralized clearing and exchange-based trading.  Bespoke instruments, being one of a kind, 
are necessarily bought and sold over the counter.  Banning such instruments, which would deny issuers the 
ability to ensure themselves against idiosyncratic risks, might be a bridge too far.  But the associated 
externality – that securities traded over-the-counter pose greater risks to systemic stability – should be 
internalized by holding investors in such instruments to higher capital charges.   8
Fifth, the compensation practices should be reformed to better align the interests 
of key decision makers and shareholders.  Officials are reluctant to interfere in these 
intimate private sector matters, preferring to leave compensation decisions to the 
consenting adults involved.  But experience suggests that corporate boards do not always 
have the independence and outside directors do not have the information needed to take 
decisions appropriately incentivizing those they oversee.  Bonuses linked to the 
performance of the trading desk, division or firm in the most recent year can encourage 
practices that inflate current returns at the expense of the long-term viability of the firm.  
A compromise would be to leave decisions regarding overall compensation to the firm 
but require that bonuses be linked to medium- rather than short-term performance and 
mandate that they be clawed back in the event of subsequent problems.
16 
Sixth and finally, there should be an agency responsible for macro-prudential 
supervision – for the stability of the financial system as opposed to just its constituent 
parts.
17  The Obama Administration would create a Financial Services Oversight Council 
chaired by the Treasury (and with its own permanent professional staff) to identify 
potential risks to systemic stability and give the Fed regulatory power over individual 
systemically important financial institutions.  The Brown Government would vest the 
Financial Services Authority, the UK’s unified regulator, with this responsibility.  The 
                                                 
16 This problem of compensation practices points to larger problems with the corporate governance of large 
financial institutions. Fixing these problems is not straightforward: strengthening the fiduciary 
responsibility of directors would more effectively incentivize existing board members but discourage 
qualified individuals from serving. One desirable reform would be more independence for the risk 
management function.  The chief risk officer should be required to report directly to the board of directors 
as opposed to the CEO, and his compensation should be tied to the stability of the firm and not simply its 
profits. Buiter (2009) recommends subjecting all new board members to a written test, set by the regulator 
and marked by independent experts, on the products, services and instruments traded and managed by their 
financial institutions, to guard against the danger that directors are inadequately knowledgeable of the 
business they oversee. 
17 The latter being known, for present purposes, as micro-prudential supervision.   9
EU would create a European Systemic Risk Council made up of European central banks 
and regulators and chaired by the president of the ECB.
18  Other countries have yet to 
fully specify how they would organize macro-prudential supervision. 
Challenges at the National Level.  Implementing these principles at the national 
level is not straightforward.  To start, moving to higher capital requirements creates a 
transition problem.  Assuming that there is no appetite for a taxpayer gift to the banks, it 
implies a long period of subdued lending as banks limit the growth of the denominator of 
the capital-to-asset ratio.  Then there are practical issues of how to reform other 
dimensions of capital adequacy requirements.  While it may be straightforward to index 
capital adequacy to the size of a financial institution, size really is of concern only insofar 
as it has implications for systemic stability.  Size in and of itself is a poor proxy for the 
threat to systemic stability posed by the failure of a particular institution; the variables of 
interest are systemic importance or connectedness.  And it is not clear that regulators 
know how to measure these things.
19 
 Indexing capital ratios to the cycle may similarly be less than straightforward.  
Should these be indexed to the growth of GDP or the growth of bank lending?  There 
may be agreement that internal models and commercial credit ratings are weak bases on 
which to assess the riskiness of a bank’s investments for purposes of capital adequacy, 
but it is not clear what to replace them with.  The current fashion is to supplement 
existing measures with a simple leverage ratio (the ratio of capital to unweighted assets). 
                                                 
18 More on this below. 
19 Avinash Persaud (2009) has suggested relating capital requirements to cross-institution correlations 
(whether a bank holds the same assets as other banks and may be inclined or forced to sell them at the same 
time, posing a threat to the stability of the system). Do regulators in fact know how to implement such a 
complex capital adequacy regime? The U.S. Treasury evidently proposes to place financial institutions into 
a couple of categories by size and connectedness, requiring so-called Tier 1 financial institutions to hold 
more capital  (U.S. Treasury 2009b);  in principle one would want a more nuanced categorization.   10
But the latter ignores entirely the correlations between the returns on different assets.  It 
thus implies very different degrees of self-protection for different financial institutions.
20  
A special resolution regime will send a clear signal to banks’ unsecured creditors 
that they too are at risk in the event of insolvency – that their claims will be wiped out if 
the institution is dismantled and that they will be liquidated or converted from debt to 
equity if it is restructured and allowed to continue.  But this will make it more difficult 
for banks to access debt finance precisely when capital is scarce.
21  Then there is the 
question of to what entities exactly the special resolution regime should apply: insurance 
companies, hedge funds, finance companies and credit unions as well as banks, for 
example?
22  Finally there is the question of who in a fragmented regulatory system 
activates the special resolution regime. The Insurance Commissioner of the State of New 
York regulated AIG’s investment activities, the Pennsylvania Insurance Department its 
property and casualty businesses, and the Delaware Insurance Department its life 
insurance business.  Which would be responsible for determining that the company had 
failed to meet the threshold conditions for financial solvency?
23 
To ensure adequate information on hedge-fund operations, U.S. regulators are 
moving toward a system where all hedge funds register with the authorities.  Under the 
Treasury’s July 15, 2009 proposal, hedge funds, private equity funds and venture firms 
                                                 
20 By way of example, these questions are all implicit in U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner’s statement of 
principles for reforming the capital adequacy regime in the United States and globally (U.S. Treasury 
2009b), but they remain unanswered. 
21 There is also an issue of fairness insofar as bondholders purchased the bonds of bank holding companies 
in the expectation that they would be protected by the provisions of the currently applicable bankruptcy 
code. 
22 My own answer is “all of the above” if they are systemically significant.   
23 This problem could in principle be solved by establishing a single consolidated regulator, but in the U.S. 
at least this does not appear to be in the cards.  The Obama Administration’s White Paper (U.S. Treasury 
2009a) would have the Treasury Department invoke this authority after consulting  with the President and 
the relevant regulators.  Cohen and Goldstein recommend that the decision to activate should be vested in 
the Treasury on the written recommendation of two thirds of the members of the Federal Reserve and FDIC 
boards.   11
with more than $30 million in assets would be required to register with the SEC and to 
report assets, leverage, off-balance-sheet holdings, and other investments on a 
confidential basis.
24  The SEC would possess power of examination and the right to share 
this information with other regulators.   But the form and content of these “periodic” 
reports remains to be specified.  And the speed with which hedge funds trade raises 
questions about the timeliness of the information.  Information on last week’s hedge fund 
portfolio is at best only marginally more informative than no information at all.
25   
Neither is requiring underwriters to retain a portion of any security they issue as 
straightforward as it may seem.  Financial engineers would be quick to identify other 
securities that are correlated with the issue in question and short them as a way of 
hedging out the position and its implications for behavior.  Long positions in other 
investments whose returns are negatively correlated with the issue could be used to the 
same end.  It is hard to imagine that requiring the originator to hold onto a fraction of the 
issue would have much impact on behavior when the entire portfolio was taken into 
account.   
And even ignoring the scope for hedging, it is not clear that requiring a bank to 
hold onto 5 per cent of the issue, as proposed by the Obama Administration, would have 
much impact on its underwriting activities.  Investment banks in fact had been forced to 
warehouse more that 5 per cent of the subprime related securities issued in the late stages 
of the housing boom, and this did not deter them from originating them as fast as they 
                                                 
24 Some hedge funds are already required to register with the SEC.  The existing loophole is for private 
advisors with fewer than 15 investors that do not proffer general investment advice.  But these existing 
registration requirements do not come with reporting requirements. 
25 And for hedge funds that churn their portfolios rapidly, it may be positively misleading.  Whether it is 
possible for hedge funds to provide and regulators to process in real time information on funds’ portfolios, 
as advocated by Blinder (2009) and Calomiris (2009), is an open question.   12
could.  Requiring the underwriter to retain a larger share of the issue might have more 
substantial effects, but this could result dangerous portfolio concentrations.
26  And even 
then, to the extent that underwriting and investment decisions take place in different arms 
of the financial group, it is not obvious that the exposure of those responsible for the 
latter will impact the behavior of the former. 
Forcing transactions in derivative securities through a clearinghouse or exchange 
would have costs in terms of instrument diversity, since only a limited number of 
securities subject to a critical mass of transactions would be feasible for centralized 
clearing and exchange-based trading.  Offering customized contracts for insuring against 
idiosyncratic risks would become more costly.  The central counterparty would also, by 
definition, be a locus of systemic risk.  In the United States clearinghouses are regulated 
by the Fed and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  For stability purposes they 
will have to be regulated closely.  The question then becomes how to plan for a 
government rescue of the clearinghouse without distorting the incentives of its operators. 
Finally there are questions about the effectiveness of macro-prudential oversight.  
Recall how under the Obama Administration’s proposal macro-prudential supervision 
would be the responsibility of a Financial Services Oversight Council chaired by the 
Treasury while macro-prudential regulation of systemically important institutions would 
be undertaken by the Fed.
27  Making macro-prudential supervision the responsibility of a 
council of regulators is a recipe for endless bickering over the existence of risks, the 
definition of bubbles, and the assignment of responsibilities.  When setting guidelines and 
                                                 
26 If so the appropriate response would be still higher capital requirements.  This might make securitization 
more costly, but so be it. 
27 In the UK there is similarly a debate over where to place ultimate responsibility for macro-prudential 
supervision, with the Financial Services Authority (the preference of the current Labour Government) or 
the Bank of England (as proposed by the shadow finance minister of the Conservative opposition).   13
identifying risks is the responsibility of one entity but enforcing regulations and 
otherwise intervening in the operations of systemically important institutions is the 
responsibility of another, can we be confident of adequate coordination?   
The alternative of placing both functions within a single institution eliminates this 
coordination problem but creates other difficulties.  Making the central bank the sole 
macro-prudential supervisor and regulator may create a conflict with its price-stability 
objective and expose it to unwelcome political scrutiny.  But assigning those 
responsibilities to an independent supervisor may limit information flows to and from the 
central bank and complicate the lender-of-last-resort function.
28 It is not clear that there is 
a single optimal solution to this assignment problem or even a clear second best.
29     
Challenges at the Global Level.  In a world in which human and financial capital 
are mobile, few of these reforms are likely to be feasible and effective without 
international cooperation.   
This has long been recognized in the case of capital adequacy, given the incentive 
for individual jurisdictions to impose less demanding requirements in order to attract 
business.  The Basel process was designed to address this problem, but its track record is 
less than reassuring.  The negotiation of Basel II, now shown to have been deeply 
deficient, occupied the better part of a decade.  Given the recent demonstration of the 
costs of financial instability, it is clear that we cannot wait another decade for Basel III.    
What has been done?  The Basel Committee has agreed to increase trading book 
capital requirements to reflect liquidity as well as default risk.  It has pledged to submit 
proposals by the end of 2009 for countercyclical buffers and provisioning over the cycle.  
                                                 
28 As arguably happened in the UK in the case of Northern Rock. 
29 The author, for what it is worth, inclines in the direction of making the central bank the consolidated 
macro-prudential supervisor, notwithstanding the associated conflicts and unwanted political attention.   14
The Financial Stability Board has produced recommendations designed to reduce reliance 
on cyclical Value-at-Risk-based capital estimates and to supplement risk-based capital 
requirements with a leverage ratio.  The question is whether these limited steps will be 
enough. 
For capital adequacy there at least exists an established process.  Negotiating rules 
for executive compensation will be harder insofar as there is no established international 
venue.  The Financial Stability Board has agreed on principles for the Governance of 
Compensation Systems, but the mere existence of principles does not guarantee that 
anything will be done.
30  Implementation is by national authorities who will be concerned 
with brain drain and institutional flight.   
One approach would be to proceed under existing corporate governance 
conventions.  Compensation rules are properly the domain of corporate boards and 
compensation committees.  The OECD has promulgated principles for sound corporate 
governance and consulted with its members and civil society on the role of governance 
failures in the financial crisis.  Unfortunately, aside from monitoring the compliance or 
otherwise of members, it has no way of enforcing its recommendations. 
Similarly, in a world where bank holding companies operate globally, an effective 
resolution regime cannot be organized at the national level.   Host supervisors and 
creditors may discover that all of a group’s liquidity is in another jurisdiction, available 
first to creditors there.  In turn this can alter the incentives for home regulators to be 
forthcoming in their interactions with host supervisors.   
In the case of nonfinancial firms there has been some progress at harmonizing 
these arrangements.  The International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency and 
                                                 
30 See Financial Stability Forum (2009).   15
Bankruptcy Professionals (INSOL International), Committee J of the International Bar 
Association, and UNCITRAL (the United National Commission on International Trade 
Law) all have commissioned working papers, organized meetings and created working 
groups to encourage informal cooperation, foster the recognition of foreign insolvency 
proceedings, and promote model legislation.  But the harmonization of special resolution 
arrangements for financial institutions has lagged.   
Only in the EU has there been agreement on the adoption of a uniform insolvency 
law for banks.  The Commission’s Credit Institutions Reorganization and Winding-Up 
Directive introduced a single entity regime in 2001.
31  But even there difficulties remain.  
Recall Fortis, the Dutch-Belgian-Luxembourg financial services company hit by the 
subprime crisis.  In the interest of maintaining existing synergies, the Belgian authorities 
agreed to put up 50 per cent of the rescue fund, the Dutch authorities 40 per cent, and the 
Luxembourg authorities 10 per cent.  But these efforts at cross-border fiscal burden 
sharing lasted all of a week after which they collapsed over disputes between the 
contributors.  Rather than savings the baby, the three national authorities chose to 
dismember it.  The Dutch government took 100 per cent of the Dutch operations, the 
Belgian authorities 100 per cent of the Belgian operations, and the Luxembourg 
authorities 100 per cent of the Luxembourg operations.  So much for synergies.  And not 
even this was straightforward.  In June 2009 Fortis Bank Netherlands (owned by the 
Dutch State) and Fortis Holdings (a Belgian-listed company) ended up in court, litigating 
which rump unit was responsible for paying preference shareholders.
32 
                                                 
31 See Tucker (2009). 
32 In a dispute that looks like it will take several years to resolve.   16
Turning to securities markets, there is the fact that over-the-counter transactions 
can migrate.  Banning them in one jurisdiction may only cause them to move to another.  
Even heavier capital requirements for institutions with positions in credit default and 
interest rate swaps may be ineffective when not all jurisdictions cooperate in applying 
them.  The solution presumably is to incorporate such measures into the revised Basel 
capital accord, though this has yet to be done.  
Then there is where to locate clearinghouses and how to avoid unnecessary 
proliferation.
33  In addition to the two clearinghouses set up in the United States in 2009, 
five more have been established or proposed in Europe, and it will not be long before 
more follow in Asia.  Netting positive and negative exposures is difficult if some CDS 
positions of an individual derivatives dealer are cleared through one clearinghouse while 
others are cleared through different clearinghouse.
34  In addition, clearinghouses may be 
tempted to relax collateral standards and reduce guarantee fund contributions in order to 
attract business, in which case their stability will be at risk.     
One solution is to work on netting across clearinghouses.  But this will require 
strong standardization of contracts and collateral terms – stronger standardization than in 
current proposals.  Another solution would be to agree on the location of one or a small 
handful of clearinghouses.  But not only is this is politically difficult, it puts regulation of 
that global clearinghouse in the hands of a particular set of national authorities who may 
or may not follow policies congenial to the others.
35 
                                                 
33 For more on these issues see Duffie (2009). 
34 They are inefficient if different derivatives (credit default swaps, interest rate swaps) are cleared through 
separate clearinghouses. 
35 Still another idea would be for national authorities to agree on a single clearinghouse to be operated and 
backstopped by a multilateral organization such as the IMF.  But this would be a radical departure for what 
is a fundamentally monetary institution.  And it would entail ceding significant national prerogatives to an 
international organization.   17
Then there is what to do about the rating agencies.  In July the Obama 
Administration proposed new legislation under which rating agencies would have to 
register with the SEC and document their internal controls, due diligence and rating 
methodologies.  The proposed legislation would also prohibit rating agencies from 
advising clients whose securities they also rate.  The EU has agreed to create a college of 
supervisors for each rating agency and committed to adopting legislation for a single 
European supervisor for rating agencies by July 2010.  That supervisor will presumably 
demand action limiting conflicts of interest and otherwise ensuring minimally acceptable 
practice.  But even if the EU moves to a single supervisor, the international community 
will inevitably be left to rely on a college of supervisors, given resistance at the global 
level to establishing a single supervisor. Whether U.S., European, Asian, Latin American 
and other officials can work together to ensure that the rating agencies adopt sound 
methodologies and avoid conflicts of interest, while at the same time reducing the 
dependence of the regulatory regime on the ratings they issue, remains to be seen.
36  
Finally there is how to conduct macro-prudential supervision at the international 
level.  Financial institutions and markets are international; so too therefore must be the 
macro-prudential response.  Here again Europe epitomizes the challenges, given the deep 
integration of its financial markets.  The Commission has endorsed the recommendations 
of the de Larosiere Group to establish a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) for 
macro-prudential supervision to identify risks, sound warnings and issue guidelines for 
corrective action.
37  The ESRC will function under the Governing Council of the 
European System of Central Banks, chaired by the president of the ECB, with the 
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it did not recommend moving toward a new regulatory regime.  This is not promising. 
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representatives of all 27 EU central banks present along with the presidents of three 
supervisory bodies: the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority, and the European Securities Authority.
38   
 But the ESRC will have no responsibility for regulation, financial supervision, or 
monetary and fiscal policies, the three key pillars of macro-prudential supervision.  It will 
have no ability to change actual policies in these areas, only the ability to communicate 
its findings to the competent national authorities.  As the de Larosiere Report emphasized, 
binding mechanisms are needed to ensure that the macro-prudential findings of these 
bodies are followed by micro-prudential supervisors.  It is proposed that the ESRC or its 
constituents could request the Commission to adopt a decision that there has been a 
“manifest breach” of Community law and thereby require a national supervisory 
authority to take a specific action in order to come into compliance.  In this way the 
ESRC and the Commission together would have the power to compel corrective action 
on the part of national authorities – assuming of course that national authorities assign 
them this power. 
What is difficult at the European level is even more difficult globally.  The 
approach that emerged from the G20 process would put the newly expanded and 
reconstituted Financial Stability Board in the pilot’s seat, with the IMF as co-pilot.  The 
FSB will set guidelines for and to support the establishment of supervisory colleges for 
systemically important firms, collaborate with the IMF on early warning exercises, and 
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supervisors on the risk council.  But it is not clear how to fix this given the presence of 50 some supervisors 
in the EU.  A further problem is that the lines between insurance, pensions and securities are blurring.  
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) suggest moving directly to two institutions a one for banking and one 
for securities markets.  But then there would be even heavier numerical overrepresentation of central 
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undertake strategic reviews of the policy work of international standard setting bodies.  It 
will do so by establishing Standing Committees on Vulnerabilities Assessment, on 
Regulatory and Supervisory Cooperation, and on Standards Implementation and by 
expanding its secretariat.  As I read it, the idea is that the IMF would report its findings 
on financial stability risks to the FSB.  The FSB would then identify “enhancements” to 
regulatory frameworks to mitigate risks and communicate these to the relevant national 
authorities.  But it would not have enforcement powers.  
Then again, creating a global macro-prudential supervisor with enforcement 
powers may not be as infeasible as commonly believed.  Imagine creating a World 
Financial Organization analogous to the already-existing World Trade Organization 
(WTO).
39  In the same way that the WTO establishes principles for trade policy 
(nondiscrimination, reciprocity, transparency, binding and enforceable commitments) 
without specifying outcomes, the WFO would establish principles for prudential 
supervision (capital and liquidity requirements, limits on portfolio concentrations and 
connected lending, adequacy of risk measurement systems and internal controls) without 
prescribing the structure of regulation in detail.
40  The WFO would define obligations for 
its members; the latter would be obliged to meet international standards for supervision 
and regulation of their financial markets and institutions.  Membership would be 
obligatory for all countries seeking freedom of access to foreign markets for 
domestically-chartered financial institutions.   The WFO would appoint independent 
panels of experts to determine whether countries were in compliance with their 
obligations.  Importantly, it would authorize sanctions against countries that failed to 
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comply.  Other members would be within their rights to restrict the ability of banks and 
nonbank financial institutions chartered in the offending country to do business in their 
markets.  This would provide a real incentive to comply. 
It will be objected that national governments will never let an international 
organization dictate their domestic regulatory policies.  The rebuttal is that the WFO 
would not dictate.  The specifics of implementation would be left to the individual 
country.  Members would be able to tailor supervision and regulation to the particularities 
of their financial markets.  But those regulatory specifics would have to comply with the 
broad principles set down in the WFO charter and associated obligations.  
We already do the equivalent for trade.  Dispute settlement panels already 
determine whether, inter alia, U.S. tariffs on timber imports from Canada are in 
compliance with the United States’ WTO obligations.  If not, we have the choice of 
whether to change those laws or face sanctions and retaliation.  If the U.S. and other 
countries accept this in the case of trade, why should they not accept it for finance? 
 
Global Imbalances and Global Policy Reforms 
  The other view of the crisis focuses on global imbalances.  The run-up in asset 
prices and associated financial excesses derived in this view from the combination of 
accommodative policy in the United States and large capital inflows from emerging Asia 
and petroleum-producing countries.  China’s current account surplus rose from less than 
2 per cent of GDP early in the decade to a whopping 11 per cent in 2007.  Under other 
circumstances such large surpluses resulting in foreign-asset accumulation would have 
led to real exchange rate appreciation through some combination of nominal appreciation   21
and inflation.  But China sterilized the asset accumulation, squirreling it in international 
reserves held largely in U.S. treasury and agency securities.  Moreover, while China’s 
reserves grew rapidly it was not alone: India, South Korea and Taiwan, among others, 
also saw very sharp increases in reserves.  Oil-exporting countries also ran large current 
account surpluses and accumulated considerable quantities of reserves after 2000.  
Russia’s reserves rose from negligible levels at the beginning of the decade to nearly 
$150 billion at the end of 2007.  More generally there were large petrodollar flows from 
the Persian Gulf states, Russia, Nigeria and Venezuela toward the United States and other 
advanced-country markets. 
  While China, the rest of emerging Asia, and the oil exporters all had rising 
national savings after the turn of the century, their national investment rates also rose.  
But those increases were inadequate to absorb the growing pool of savings.  Investment 
rates in China were in fact extraordinarily high by international standards, and it is not 
clear that the country could have deepened its capital stock even more rapidly without 
significant inefficiencies.
41  Other emerging Asian countries had maintained higher gross 
investment rates and kept their aggregate current account broadly in balance prior to the 
financial crisis of 1997-8, but some of this investment had been inefficient: it reflected 
directed-credit policies of governments resisting the inevitable deceleration from the 
high-growth period and empire-building by highly-leveraged family-owned 
conglomerates.  These problems were corrected, at least in part, following the crisis.  
Investment rates in emerging Asia ex China recovered from their post-crisis lows after 
the turn of the century but never re-scaled the inefficiently high levels of 1993-6.  The oil 
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exporters saw modest increases in their investment rates in 2000 and 2006-7, but not on 
the scale needed to absorb their rapidly deepening pool of saving.
42   
  All this money had to go somewhere, and much of it flowed to the United States.  
One estimate (Warnock and Warnock 2006) suggests that U.S. treasury rates were 100 
basis points lower than they would have been in the absence of foreign inflows.  The Fed 
raised short-term rates from 1 to 5.25 per cent between mid-2004 and mid-2006, but the 
yield on ten-year treasuries actually fell over the period.
43  This was Chairman 
Greenspan’s “bond market conundrum,” which his successor and others ascribed to the 
so-called “global savings glut.”  Low real interest rates on ten-year treasuries pushed 
capital into other assets.  The consequent higher home and stock market valuations had 
positive wealth effects on spending.  Measured household savings in the U.S. fell from 
approximately 10 per cent of disposable income in the first half of the 1980s and 7 per 
cent in the early 1990s to close to zero in 2005-2007.
44 
  Spending was further encouraged by U.S. monetary and fiscal policies.  While the 
Fed raised short-term interest rates in 2004-6, it started from exceptionally low levels, 
                                                 
42 In the Bretton Woods II view, China’s investment in U.S. treasury and agency securities reflected the 
inefficiency of its financial system: the Chinese authorities invested (on behalf of their residents) in U.S. 
financial assets, and U.S. financial institutions used the resulting liquidity and their superior investment 
expertise to channel resources to U.S. corporations which invested directly in China (see Dooley and 
Garber 2005).  The flaw in this view was always that FDI into China plus domestically-financed investment 
fell short of Chinese savings.  In other words, there did not exist profitable investment opportunities 
sufficient to absorb the pool of Chinese savings, regardless of who did the intermediation.  The flaw in the 
Bretton Woods II story, in other words, is that while it could explain the two way flow of capital it could 
not explain the current account imbalance. 
43 From 4.7 to 4.5 per cent. 
44 The ratio of total household debt to disposable income rose meanwhile from 80 per cent in the 1990s to 
nearly 135 per cent in 2007. It was also argued at the time that increased consumer spending reflected the 
belief that productivity growth had accelerated permanently—that household debt could rise now because 
of expectations of increased disposable income in the future. The problem with this argument is that it 
doesn’t explain why U.S. households chose to leverage in response but the U.S. corporate sector did not, 
since higher expected future incomes for households should have had as their counterparts higher expected 
future revenues for firms, which would have encouraged them to assume higher debt ratios, which they did 
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reflecting the low rates put in place in response to 9/11 and the 2002-3 deflation scare.  It 
hesitated to normalize too fast for fear of choking off the expansion.  The Federal funds 
rate was consistently below Taylor Rule levels between 2002 and 2007.
45  Fiscal policy 
operated in the same direction.  The most reliable way of preventing overheating and 
discouraging capital inflows is of course by tightening fiscal policy.
46  And, after a long 
period of deficits, net borrowing by the U.S. public sector had actually gone negative in 
1998-2000.
47  But public-sector borrowing resumed in late 2001 with the recession and 
the Bush tax cuts.  Public sector net borrowing in fact exceeded net borrowing by 
households in most quarters between the beginning of 2002 and the end of 2007.   
The effect of all of this was that the U.S. current account deficit reached 6 per 
cent of GDP in 2006.
48  Slightly more convoluted is the link to the particular constellation 
of financial weaknesses that culminated in the crisis.  The story as typically told goes like 
this.
49  Low yields on ten-year treasuries encouraged money to flow into higher-yielding 
assets backed by, inter alia, residential mortgages.  Mortgage originations as a share of 
total mortgage debt outstanding thus rose from 6 per cent in 1985-2000 to 10 per cent in 
2001-2006.  To meet the demand for mortgage-back securities, lending standards for 
residential mortgages were relaxed.  Agency problems between mortgage brokers who 
originated the loans, financial institutions who packaged and distributed them, and 
investors who purchased them allowed this problem to go uncorrected.
50  The income 
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47 Recall contemporary fears of a shortage of marketable U.S. treasury securities and questions, which now 
seem quaint, about how monetary policy might be conducted in their absence. 
48 Note that the U.S. was not alone in seeing its current account deficit widen: similar trends were evident 
in, inter alia, Australia, New Zealand, the UK and Spain, among others. 
49 My favorite rendition is Goldman Sachs (2009). 
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streams associated with those mortgages were then sliced, diced, repackaged and insured 
to render them compatible with the covenants and capital requirements of institutional 
investors. 
A variety of feedbacks amplified these dynamics. Lower lending standards and 
easy mortgage finance pushed housing prices even higher, which encouraged further 
reductions in standards by lenders impressed by the increase in the value of real-estate 
collateral.  The increase in mortgage activity encouraged entry by brokers and squeezed 
margins, further aggravating agency problems at origination.  Higher asset prices 
encouraged larger flows into U.S. financial markets from domestic and foreign investors 
convinced that past performance was a guide to future returns.  Higher asset prices also 
meant more revenues for state and local governments that depend on capital gains and 
property taxes, respectively, for much of their income; these ramped up their spending 
accordingly.  All these were typical responses to a surge of capital inflows.  The only 
difference from earlier capital flow bonanzas was that this time the country on the 
receiving end was the United States.     
Starting in 2007 these same feedbacks shifted into reverse.  Private foreign 
demand for additional U.S. portfolio investments disappeared in the early part of 2007.  
The result was a weaker dollar and tighter U.S. financial conditions. U.S. housing prices, 
having reached historically high levels, had already been in decline since the summer of 
2006, causing delinquencies, starting in the subprime segment of the market, to rise 
sharply.
51 This created problems for debt securities backed by claims on pools of 
mortgages and, in turn, for institutions like American Home Mortgage Investment 
Corporation, BNP Paribas and Countrywide Credit heavily involved with them. They had 
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to sell other assets in order to square their books, raise liquidity, and meet shareholder 
redemptions.  The more highly leveraged the institution, the more extensive the resulting 
fire sales.  The U.S. economy as a whole and its financial sector in particular having 
become more leveraged during the expansion, deleveraging now was dramatic.  Banks, 
under balance-sheet stress and seeing the value of collateral eroding, raised lending 
standards, putting further downward pressure on housing prices.
52  Private foreign 
investors who had previously bought U.S. financial assets with wild abandon now 
withdrew from the market en masse.  The story of the crisis can be told more colorfully 
and in more detail.  But from the point of view of our second explanation emphasizing 
global imbalances, this was the essence of the matter. 
Policy Implications.  From this diagnosis again flows a prescription for policy 
responses. As in the first half of the paper, I highlight six.   
  First, monetary policy makers must worry about imbalances even in the absence 
of inflation.  The first half of the present decade was notable for the absence of overt 
inflation in the United States.  But even if low interest rates did not spur commodity-price 
inflation, they fed asset-price inflation through the various channels enumerated above.  
They encouraged the financial excesses that set the stage for the crisis.  It follows from 
their commitment to the maintenance of macroeconomic stability that monetary policy 
makers should lean against unsustainable asset- as well as commodity-price 
developments.  Regulation alone, no matter how comprehensively reformed, cannot be 
relied on to prevent unsustainable asset-market conditions or to fully contain their 
consequences.  The textbook view of inflation targeting in which asset-market 
developments matter only insofar as they convey information about prospective future 
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commodity-price inflation should be abandoned or at least modified to admit an 
independent role for asset-market conditions. 
  Second, policy makers in the U.S. and elsewhere should attend to the procyclical 
bias in fiscal policy.  The budget deficit and net borrowing by the public sector were 
allowed to explode in 2003-6 precisely when the U.S. economy was growing strongly 
and the current account deficit was widening.  These were years when the economy did 
not need a shot in the arm from deficit spending.  Fiscal policy makers would have done 
better to keep their powder dry.  Better still would have been to have taken the same 
advice that they regularly doled out to emerging markets – that tightening fiscal policy is 
the best way of moderating the impact of large capital inflows and, indeed, of moderating 
those inflows themselves. 
Third, a large current account deficit cannot be regarded as benign even by a 
country like the United States that borrows in its own currency.  Foreign finance for the 
current account can dry up abruptly.  The U.S. has not felt the full effects this time, 
foreign central banks having stepped in to replace much of the foreign private investment 
that evaporated, but it may not be so lucky next time.
53  A current account deficit that 
cannot be financed will necessarily be compressed; unlike other deficits, it cannot then be 
financed at home.  Such compression in turn requires a change in relative prices, 
including in the exchange rate, which can catch investors wrong footed.  It can also 
precipitate a recession if it takes time to shift resources between the production of 
nontraded and traded goods.  The same arguments leading to the conclusion that 
monetary and fiscal policy makers cannot afford to disregard asset-market developments 
similarly suggest that they cannot afford to disregard the current account.  
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  Fourth, countries equally cannot regard large current account surpluses with 
equanimity.  If someone else’s current account deficit puts financial stability at risk, so 
too by implication does your surplus, since the former is not possible without the latter.  
Countries where domestic saving exceeds domestic investment by a large margin have 
tools with which to boost spending, from increasing public spending directly to easing 
credit terms for household and corporate spending. 
  Fifth, relative prices must adjust to accommodate these changes in the pattern of 
demand.  Insofar as the residents of each country exhibit home bias in consumption, the 
relative price of home goods will have to rise in the surplus country and fall in the deficit 
country.  Ruling out deflation – which policy makers in the deficit country will work hard 
to avoid – this adjustment will have to occur through some combination of inflation and 
currency appreciation in the surplus country.  For well known reasons, currency 
appreciation is the preferable alternative. 
  Sixth, reserve accumulation will have to be less insofar as surplus countries 
encourage domestic absorption and see their real exchange rates appreciate in response.  
Such countries will have to seek other ways of insuring themselves against shocks.     
  It is worth asking how history would have differed had these recommendations 
been adopted at the beginning of the decade.  U.S. monetary and fiscal policies would 
have been tighter.
54 Chinese and more generally Asian fiscal policies would have been 
looser.  Global imbalances would have been less.  Less accommodating monetary policy 
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and less capital inflow would have dampened financial excesses in the United States.
55  
The combination of less demand stimulus in the United States and more demand stimulus 
abroad would have left global demand unchanged to a first approximation.  To the extent 
that there were worries about overheating in China and elsewhere, foreign stimulus might 
not have been increased sufficiently to offset the reduction in demand stimulus in the 
United States, and the global economy would have grown more slowly.  Recall however 
that global growth in 2005-6 was the fastest in more than 30 years.  Slightly slower 
growth would have been an acceptable price to pay for warding off the most serious 
financial crisis in generations. 
Challenges at the National Level.  Challenges again arise when attempt to move 
from principle to practice.  It is easy to say that inflation targeting should be modified to 
admit a role for asset market conditions but harder to know exactly how to modify it.  For 
example, it is easy to assert with benefit of hindsight that monetary policy should have 
been tightened faster in 2004-6 in response to the rise in housing prices and widening of 
the current account deficit, but it is more difficult to say by how much.  By exactly how 
much do asset prices and the current account have to move before they justify a monetary 
policy response over and above that warranted by their implications for expected future 
inflation and the output gap?  The presumption in the debate over whether central banks 
should target asset-market conditions may have tipped away from the Jackson Hole view 
in favor of the BIS view, but earlier questions about the BIS view – starting with how 
central banks know when asset prices pose a significant threat to stability – have not gone 
away.  If the effect of asset prices on the economy is complex, nonlinear and contingent, 
then the monetary policy response to asset price fluctuations will have to be complex, 
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nonlinear and contingent.
56 Attempts to routinize monetary policy in the form of a post-
Taylor Rule are unlikely to succeed. 
  Similarly, inadequate fiscal restraint in good times is an old problem with no 
simple solution.  Institutional reforms can help, but effective reform will depend on 
circumstances.  In general, fiscal rules that limit deficit spending (but also limit fiscal 
flexibility) work best where ideological differences between political parties are 
relatively pronounced, while fiscal procedures that delegate decision making to, inter alia, 
the executive work best where ideological polarization is relatively limited.
57  In a 
presidential system like that of the United States, it may be necessary to have both 
supportive rules and procedures. Given the electoral returns to pork-barrel spending it is 
important to have powerful party leaders and a strong committee system to exercise 
agenda-setting powers and discipline members of Congress.  At the same time, when the 
balance of power between the legislative and executive branches is relatively even – also 
the U.S. case – ex ante agreements (balanced budget rules, multi-year fiscal targets) can 
be critical for fiscal discipline. But reform to give party whips and committee chairs even 
more power would be strongly resisted. And the unhappy record of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings legislation and its successors does not reassure one about the prospects for 
binding fiscal rules. 
  Countries with large current account surpluses may similarly encounter 
difficulties when attempting to narrow them in short order.  In China, significant 
reductions in household savings rates will require a stronger social safety net, something 
that cannot be built overnight. Government saving and investment can be adjusted more 
                                                 
56 A point that is not original to me; see for example Visco (2009). 
57 See Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2009).   30
quickly, but here too there are limits. For example, doubts have been voiced about the 
efficiency and productivity of the additional investment spending undertaken by China’s 
local governments since the outbreak of the crisis.
58 Such questions are likely to deter the 
central authorities from relying yet further on expansionary fiscal policy to address the 
current account imbalance.              
Challenges at the Global Level.  What to do about global imbalances may be the 
thorniest question of all.  In the years leading up to the crisis, both the United States and 
China followed the policies they did, despite voices warning of risks, because they 
perceived them as in their self interest.
59  It could be that they misperceived the balance 
of risks and rewards and that more effective advice could have alerted them to their error 
and prompted corrective action.  It could be that they failed to understand the impact of 
their policies on other countries and that more effective consultation would have caused 
them to recognize the existence of these spillovers and, good global citizens they are, to 
internalize them.  It could be that there existed policy adjustments that would have been 
mutually beneficial if taken in tandem even though either would have been welfare 
reducing for the country concerned if taken in isolation.  It could be, in other words, that 
what was needed was more effective policy coordination. 
  The problem is that there already exist mechanisms for correcting these 
deficiencies. Warning of the risks posed by large current account deficits is at the heart of 
the IMF’s country surveillance. The Fund issued warnings about the danger that chronic 
large U.S. current account deficits could result in a disorderly adjustment, but these led to 
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59 Here “China” is shorthand for surplus countries generally.  “The United States” is, similarly, a stand-in 
for deficit countries generally, although the fact that United States accounted for the vast majority of global 
current account deficits in the years leading up to the crisis means that this shorthand does little violence to 
the facts.   31
no changes in U.S. policy.  It expressed reservations about the constellation of policies 
that resulted in large and growing Chinese surpluses but again without noticeable results.     
  Similarly, the IMF’s multilateral surveillance is designed to alert countries to the 
spillovers and external effects of their policies.  Instruments here include the IMF’s two 
flagship reports, the World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Report, its 
Regional Outlooks, its contributions to interregional committees and forums (the G7/8, 
G10, G20 etc.), and confidential briefings on internal evaluations like those undertaken 
by the Coordinating Group on Exchange Rate Issues. The spring and autumn 2005 WEOs 
devoted considerable space to the factors underlying global imbalances, the risks, and the 
appropriate policy response, again without discernible results. 
Since 2006 the IMF’s arsenal has included a Multilateral Consultations Initiative 
bringing together a small number of countries for whom such spillovers are first order.  
The first such consultation, announced on June 2006 and concluded with an Executive 
Board discussion in July 2007 (note the date), brought together the United States, China, 
Japan, the Euro Area and Saudi Arabia to discuss the cross-border impacts of global 
imbalances.  This consultation started with bilateral staff visits with the five participants 
followed by multilateral meetings and a joint report.  The report mentioned how the 
process had been “useful” and how it had “contributed to an improved understanding of 
the issues and each other’s positions.”
60 Again, however, it is hard to see that this useful 
initiative and improved understanding led to significant adjustments in the policies of the 
countries in question. 
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Finally, if the problem is to coordinate policy adjustments that are unappealing in 
isolation but mutually beneficial if undertaken jointly, then there already are mechanisms 
for achieving this. There is the aforementioned Multilateral Consultations Initiative.  
There are country grouping ranging from the G7/8 to the G20. There are bilateral 
consultations among governments such as the annual U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue. If 
there is a shortage of coordinated action, it is not for a shortage of venues for 
coordination. 
      Why these processes did not lead to different outcomes is familiar enough.  
While the IMF can issue warnings, it cannot compel policy adjustments by countries that 
do not borrow from it, either because they have no difficulty borrowing on the market 
(the U.S. case in the period leading up to the crisis) or because on net they do not borrow 
at all (the Chinese case). Louder warnings might be more likely to elicit action, but these 
would be problematic on a number of grounds. IMF staff and management operate under 
the oversight of the Executive Board, which speaks for the governments about whose 
policies they are warning. Large shareholders could push back against warnings that 
cause them significant embarrassment, through actions in the Board that make 
management’s position untenable.  Staff and management know this and choose their 
language accordingly. 
  Likewise, the notion that good global citizens should internalize the cross-border 
spillovers of their policies and that difficult policy adjustments may be easier when 
coordinated internationally runs up against domestic political constraints.  The 
Multilateral Consultation on global imbalances resulted in statements by the United 
States that it would pursue fiscal consolidation and from China that it would encourage   33
domestic spending.  But for the U.S. meaningful fiscal consolidation would have meant 
tax increases, which were a nonstarter politically.  For China ramping up domestic 
spending more rapidly (which, in practice, would have meant ramping up public 
spending) would have meant ramping down something else given that the economy was 
operating close to capacity. That something else would have been exports, which would 
have antagonized politically influential export interests.
61 For other Asian countries, it 
would have meant forgoing the reserve accumulation seen as the first line of defense 
against financial instability. 
  The familiar responses to these problems go as follows. The IMF needs to devote 
more resources to surveillance – and so it has gone on a hiring binge since the crisis.  It 
needs to develop better early warning indicators – notwithstanding the fundamental 
difficulties of crisis prediction and the failure of all concerned to predict the last one.
62  
Governments should take the results of such surveillance and early-warning exercises 
more seriously – despite their manifest reluctance to do so over the years.  They should 
behave more cooperatively. 
  In addition to relying on clearer crystal balls and better behavior, it might be 
worthwhile to think about more ambitious reforms. None of the initiatives I am about to 
describe will happen overnight.  The political obstacles are formidable.  But if one takes 
seriously the risks posed by global imbalances, they are worth contemplating.  
                                                 
61 This adjustment to prevent the economy from overheating would have been achieved by allowing the 
currency to appreciate.  Of course, there was no such currency adjustment after November 2008 when 
Chinese public spending was ramped up, but then there was no longer a danger of the economy overheating, 
export demand having collapsed.  And given that increased public spending no longer threatened to crowd 
out exports, given that growth had slowed relative to capacity, opposition to increased public expenditure 
was less. 
62 My favorite statement of the limitations of such early warning exercises is Eichengreen and Rose (1999).  
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   One option would be strengthen IMF surveillance by giving greater independence 
to those vested with the surveillance function.  The IMF department responsible for 
surveillance would function independently of management and the Board.  Firewalls 
would separate surveillance from other IMF functions like emergency lending.  The 
surveillance unit would have its own budget.  It would be overseen by a director 
appointed to a single long term in office. It could issue reports without the prior approval 
of management or the Board.  It would be able to call a spade a spade.  The IMF has 
adopted this kind of structure for its Independent Evaluation Office, which is independent 
of management, operates at arm’s length from the Board, and is overseen by a director 
serving a single six-year term.  The UK government in 2003 proposed this kind of 
structure for the surveillance function.
63 
  But what we have learned about the effectiveness of Chinese Walls in other 
financial institutions gives grounds for questioning whether they would be effective in 
this context.  Staff will be moving back and forth between the surveillance unit and other 
departments.
64 Can they really be expected to ignore the preferences of management and 
the Board?  Can they really be expected to disregard the ability of management and the 
Board to shape their career prospects in other departments?  The crisis has also alerted us 
to the kind of problems that can arise when the monitoring function is allocated to one 
entity and the lending function to another.
65 Effective firewalls and seamless information 
sharing do not go hand in hand. 
                                                 
63 See Balls (2003). 
64 Certainly this is the case if the experience of the IEO is any guide. 
65 Can you say “Northern Rock?”   35
A stronger alternative to imagining that a unit within the IMF can be made more 
independent is to make the entire institution more independent.
66 Members of the 
management team would service long terms. They would not have to seek the approval of 
an Executive Board of political appointees. They could issue strong surveillance 
statements.  At the same time, surveillance could be adequately coordinated with other 
functions.  An independent management team could react quickly to the events, in the 
manner of national central banks. They could adopt innovative tactics and instruments, 
much like central banks in the recent crisis. 
For such strong independence to be acceptable, management would have to be 
strongly accountable for their actions.  They would have to be more transparent about 
their decisions and their criteria for taking them.  One could imagine publication of 
minutes of their deliberations.
67  One can imagine the Managing Director holding press 
conferences summarizing the management team’s decisions, much like the president of 
the ECB. 
Management would have to be strongly accountable to the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee (IMFC), the oversight committee of 24 officials whose 
composition mirrors that of the Executive Board.  Much as the president and monetary 
policy committee of a central bank are accountable to their national parliament or 
congress, IMF management would have to justify their actions to the IMFC.  They should 
be subject to a formal vote of no confidence.  The IMFC, for its part, would be 
                                                 
66 I will be excused, I hope, for repeating this argument, having made it now for fully a decade. See 
DeGregorio, Eichengreen, Ito and Wyplosz (1999). The excuse for repeating it is that the case is, if 
anything, stronger than ever in the wake of the crisis. I argue this in Eichengreen (2009c), from where this 
paper’s material on this subject is drawn. 
67 In the manner of the Fed. This would be a small step technically, since minutes of Board meetings are 
already kept and a highly sanitized version is published as the conclusions of the chair.   36
accountable to the Board of Governors of the IMF.  The IMFC would have to be 
reconstituted as the IMF Council, as provided for under the Articles of Agreement, so 
that what are now recommendations become binding instructions to management. 
It would of course be necessary to abolish the convention that the managing 
director should be a European and his first deputy an American.  Leadership selection 
would have to reward the most qualified candidates.
68  It would be necessary to devise a 
selection mechanism for the entire management team that both picked out high-quality 
candidates and ensured a reasonable degree of geographic and economic diversity. 
For some, delegating these sensitive functions to independent technocrats would 
be a bridge too far.
69  If so, the alternative to delegation is rules.  The other way of 
insulating surveillance from politics, in other words, is by mechanizing it.  If chronic 
surpluses and deficits pose a threat to systemic stability, then another way of applying 
stronger pressure to correct them would be by automatically levying penalties on the 
countries running them.
70  A country that had run a current account surplus or deficit in 
                                                 
68 As G20 finance ministers reportedly agreed at their mid-March 2009 meeting in Sussex, England. 
69 The objection to schemes of this sort is that the decisions of the IMF are more complex and therefore 
entail more discretion than those of a central bank and that they require the Fund to put taxpayer money 
more directly at risk. Since a central bank just sets interest rates rather than applying detailed prescriptions 
for changes in the fabric of social and economic policy, it is said, independence for its monetary policy 
committee is politically tolerable. Since it just sets interest rates, an action which is easily monitored and 
assessed, holding its independent management accountable for their actions is relatively straightforward.  
And since central banks accept only high-quality collateral in their lending operations, they do not put 
serious taxpayer money at risk (typically, in contrast, they are a profit center).  In the wake of the crisis it is 
clear that none of these objections hold water. We have seen national central banks engage in very detailed 
interventions in financial and other markets. They have purchased all manner of collateral as required by 
policies of credit easing, exposing themselves to significant balance-sheet losses. The reality is that modern 
central banks, not unlike the IMF, are required to do much more than just set interest rates.  This has 
created some discomfort among observers and demands that central bankers do a better job at justifying 
their actions; it has similarly created pressure that mechanisms for holding them accountable, be these 
oversight committees of or appointed by the U.S. Congress or the relevant committees of the European 
Parliament, be strengthened. Ron Paul notwithstanding, it has not given rise to the view that central bank 
independence is intolerable or, for that matter, undesirable. 
 
70  I made this case for chronic surplus countries in Eichengreen (2009c); here I generalize the argument to 
deficit countries.   37
excess of 3 per cent of GDP for three years, for example, might be required to transfer 
resources to the Fund at the end of every year in which that excess persisted.
71  The 
transfer might equal one half of the current account balance in excess of 3 per cent of 
GDP.
72  Nothing would prevent countries from running large and persistent external 
surpluses and deficits if they found it difficult and costly to adjust saving and investment, 
but their doing so would entail an additional cost, in turn ratcheting up the pressure to 
adopt policies of adjustment.
73 This tax could be written into the Articles of Agreement 
so that collecting it would not require, inter alia, a decision by the Executive Board.
74 
A problem with a symmetrical scheme of this sort is that deficit countries may 
lack resources to transfer to the Fund.  They will be losing reserves rather than gaining 
them.  But they will be subject to market discipline.  The same is not true of surplus 
countries that feel no direct pressure from the market to adjust.  This asymmetry was 
what motivated the decision to include a scarce currency clause in the IMF’s original 
Articles of Agreement so that other countries could apply pressure for chronic surplus 
countries to adjust.  If the present measure was applied to surplus countries alone, it could 
be thought of as a price-based scarce currency clause. 
To the extent that surplus countries are motivated by the desire to accumulate 
reserves, a tax requiring them to transfer dollars or the equivalent to the IMF could 
                                                 
71 The particular thresholds mentioned in the text are purely illustrative; readers are free to substitute their 
own.  Note that nothing requires that the tax revenues be paid in to the Fund.  They equally well might go 
to the World Bank for development assistance or the United Nations for peacekeeping operations. 
72 Or the charge might initially be set at a lower level and raised to, say, 50 per cent over time (as members 
who wished to minimize it had more time to adjust).  More recently Prasad (2009) has suggested that such 
a tax might be applied to countries’ holdings of Special Drawing Rightst at the IMF and would be levied if 
a country failed to hit its target for its current account (and fiscal) balance over a three-year horizon. 
73 Economists not liking tax schedules with discontinuities, one can imagine a tax on all increases in foreign 
reserves that started at infinitesimal levels but rose fairly quickly as the increase in reserves rose as a share 
of GDP and as a function of its persistence. 
74 It would presumably be easiest to implement in a period when it was not so obvious on which members it 
would predominantly fall. It would presumably be easiest to implement in a period when it was not so 
obvious on which members it would predominantly fall.   38
conceivably have the perverse effect of encouraging them to undervalue their currencies 
still more so that they could replace the reserves that they had been forced by the 
provision to transfer to the Fund.  In other words, the tax would have a relative price 
effect and an income effect working in opposite directions.
75  Thus, marrying the current 
measure to other sources of emergency liquidity besides own reserves would make it 
more effective.  More generally, global reforms enhancing those other sources would 
mitigate the tendency for countries to run chronic surpluses. 
The most obvious source of emergency liquidity is, of course, the IMF itself.  The 
Fund’s original raison d’etre was to act as a reserve pooling arrangement.  It has recently 
received a considerable increase in the resources that it can deploy in emergency lending.  
It has streamlined its procedures for deploying them.
76  It has established a Special 
Liquidity Facility for making substantial loans of reserves without conditions to countries 
with strong policies.  Quota reform has begun to better align voice in the institution with 
21
st century realities.  Yet no Asian country has requested eligibility for the Special 
Liquidity Facility.  Other conference participants will have to explain what further 
reforms would make it politically acceptable for an Asian government to again borrow 
from the IMF. 
  The alternative is regional reserve pooling. Different countries being hit by shocks 
at different times, the timing of reserve needs will differ as well.
77 The same quantity of 
                                                 
75 The desire to accumulate reserves is only one reason, of course, why some countries are inclined to 
maintain highly competitive real exchange rates and run chronic external surpluses.  Rodrik (2008) argues 
for example that so-called undervalued exchange rates are associated with rapid economic growth because 
they encourage manufacturing employment.  To the extent that these other motives prevailed, the perverse 
“income effect” would not dominate. 
76 I cannot resist observing that an independent IMF could react to events even more quickly. 
77 Insofar as shocks have a strong regional component – different countries in a region tend to suffer them 
at the same time – regional reserve pooling is second best to global reserve pooling.  On the regional 
dimension of crises see Glick and Rose (1998).    39
reserves can go further if pooled, and effective pooling will reduce the pressure to run 
large surpluses in order to accumulate more. It will also minimize the other costs of 
reserve accumulation which range from the risk of capital losses on foreign currency 
holdings to foregoing higher levels of consumption and investment.   
The Chiang Mai Initiative, now the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
(CMIM), is the most highly developed example.  In May 2009 ASEAN+3 finance 
ministers agreed to transform their $120 billion of bilateral swaps and credits into a 
reserve pool.  Operational decisions will be by simple majority, where countries will have 
votes roughly in proportion to their contributions.  China and Japan will both contribute 
32 per cent, Korea 16 per cent, ASEAN the remainder.  The agreement also included a 
commitment to establish a regional surveillance unit, although there is no consensus on 
where to situate it or how to staff it. 
But disbursing more than 20 per cent of the credits available to a country still 
requires that it reach an agreement with the IMF.  20 per cent of a country’s entitlement is 
actually less than it contributes to the pool.  This nullifies the purpose of the arrangement, 
which is to provide an alternative to the IMF.  While there is a plan to first raise and then 
eliminate the 20 per cent threshold, this is left for some unspecified date.   
The reason is straightforward. Countries want assurances that their resources will 
not be used frivolously. They want to know that they will be repaid. But regional 
neighbors find it hard to criticize one another’s policies and demand adjustment. Political 
sensitivities run high in Asia. But even in Europe, with its long history of cooperation, 
surveillance and conditionality are outsourced to the IMF. Revealingly, the Fund and not   40
the EU has taken the lead in negotiating emergency assistance packages for Hungary and 
Latvia. 
Delinking the CMIM from the IMF will require Asian countries to undertake 
hard-hitting reviews and demand difficult policy adjustments. One solution, again, would 
be to give both surveillance responsibilities and the actual power to disburse funds to an 
independent board. Its members, enjoying statutory independence and long terms in 
office, could function like the monetary policy committee of a central bank. They could 
issue a Financial Stability Report that bluntly flags weak policies and vulnerabilities.  
And they could demand policy adjustments as a condition for disbursing funds. The 
CMIM could then be delinked from the IMF.  
Then there are a variety of proposals for reforming the international monetary 
system.  The current system already includes the one feature that is most useful for 
correcting imbalances, namely exchange rate flexibility.  This permits surplus countries 
increasing spending to raise the relative price of locally produced goods without suffering 
inflation and deficit countries doing the opposite to avoid significant deflation.  It is all to 
the good that we are unlikely to see changes in this exchange rate system as a result of the 
crisis. 
The other relevant aspect of the international monetary system is the supply of 
international reserves.  Here one encounters a variety of proposals for replacing the dollar 
with another unit.  These are based on the argument that allowing a national currency to 
constitute the dominant share of international reserves requires the country issuing it to 
run the current account deficits that are at the root of the imbalances problem.
78  It is 
                                                 
78 There are also other arguments, such as the desirability of substituting another unit, say the SDR, for 
existing dollar holdings to relieve reserve holders of the risk of capital losses on those existing dollar   41
important to understand that the “requires” part does not follow.  To see this, observe that 
the euro has gained ground as a reserve currency even though the euro area has not run 
significant current account deficits in recent years.  Or recall that countries accumulated 
dollar reserves under the original Bretton Woods System even though the U.S. had a 
balanced current account and even substantial surpluses for the vast majority of the 
period.  All that is required is that the reserve-currency country running the balanced 
current account should invest abroad at least in an amount equal to the incremental 
demand for reserves in the rest of the world. 
Hence the argument that being the sole supplier of reserves creates a tendency for 
a country to run chronic deficits must be a different one. It must be that the desire of 
other countries to accumulate reserves reduces the incentive for the reserve issuer to run a 
balanced current account. Knowing that other countries demand additional reserves and 
will willingly finance the reserve center’s current account deficit, policy makers in the 
reserve-issuing country must have less incentive to adopt painful policies that raise 
national savings to the level of national investment.
79 Think of it as a problem of moral 
hazard. 
To the extent that this moral hazard is present, the question is what to do about it.  
One idea is ongoing issuance of Special Drawing Rights to provide a non-national source 
of incremental reserves. The IMF would issue SDRs on a regular basis in amounts equal 
to the increase in global reserve demand. The problem here is that SDRs can be used only 
                                                                                                                                                 
balances.  This is the idea of creating a new “Substitution Account.”  I do not consider this here (except in a 
couple of footnotes down) for reasons of space and because it is concerned with the financial legacy of past 
imbalances rather than the question of how to prevent future imbalances.  
79 This is a conceivable result, although not a necessary one. Still, it is not implausible that this was part of 
the explanation for the imbalances problem of recent years.  In other words, there is a high probability that 
the United States would have adopted policies more closely equalizing the country’s saving and 
investment—or that the market would have brought about this result through a decline in the dollar—had 
there not existed a strong central bank demand for dollar reserves.   42
for transactions with the IMF and among consenting governments. Unlike national 
currencies they cannot be used for foreign exchange market intervention and other 
transactions with market participants. For central banks and governments that see 
reserves as insurance – that anticipate actually having to use them – this illiquidity 
renders SDRs unattractive.
80   
Making SDRs attractive would require making them liquid. This would mean 
developing private markets on which SDR claims can be bought and sold. It would be 
necessary to build broad and liquid markets on which governments and, for that matter, 
financial and nonfinancial firms can issue SDR bonds at competitive cost.  Banks would 
have to find it attractive to accept SDR-denominated deposits and extend SDR-
denominated loans.  The pension funds and insurance companies that are the dominant 
sources of private demand for bonds would have to be attracted to holding bonds 
denominated in a basket of currencies despite the fact that their liabilities tend to be 
dominated in a single national currency.
81  It would be necessary to restructure foreign 
exchange markets so that traders seeking to buy, say, Korean won for Thai baht first sold 
baht for SDRs (before buying won) rather than first selling baht for dollars.  While all 
this is possible, it would not be easy.  It is worth recalling that there was a previous 
attempt to commercialize the SDR in the 1970s that never really got off the ground.  
                                                 
80 Just why Chinese, Russian and Brazilian officials have been pushing the SDR option is an interesting 
question.  It could be that they see it as a stalking horse for a Substitution Account – as a way of getting 
existing dollar balances off their balance sheets as opposed to an alternative for accumulating future 
reserves.  It could be that they see this as a way of demonstrating their desire to be players in discussions of 
international monetary reform. Conference participants may have a better answer to this question than I. 
81 They could swap out the currency risk, but this would be an additional cost of the investment strategy, 
which would presumably render it unattractive – or require an interest-rate premium of the issuer, which 
would make issuance less attractive.   43
Succeeding this time would take decades rather than years.
82  We can discuss it at the San 
Francisco Fed’s 10
st biannual Asia-U.S. conference. 
As part of this effort, the IMF would have to be authorized to issue additional 
SDRs in periods of shortage, much as the Fed provided dollar swaps to provide dollar 
liquidity in the second half of 2008. At the moment countries holding 85 per cent of IMF 
voting power must agree before SDRs can be issued, which is not exactly a recipe for 
quick action.  IMF management would have to be empowered to decide on emergency 
SDR issuance just as the Federal Reserve can decide to offer emergency currency swaps.  
For the SDR to become a true international currency, in other words, the IMF would have 
to become more like an independent global central bank.  The idea of an independent 
IMF has its advocates, as I have made clear above, but it is not clear that China, Russia, 
Brazil and other advocates of replacing the dollar with the SDR are aware that this is the 
implication of their proposal. 
The other approach to reducing the dominance of the dollar would be to diversify 
the sources of international reserves.  The moral hazard felt by any one nation’s policy 
makers would then be limited.  Imagine 20 years from now three economies of roughly 
comparable size, each with a convertible currency traded on liquid markets that can be 
used to satisfy the incremental demand for reserves.  No one of them will be able to 
reduce its saving relative to its investment by a substantial margin simply because the 
global demand for reserves is growing.  One way of understanding how global 
imbalances grew so pronounced in recent years is that the incremental demand for 
reserves was increasingly large while the share of the reserve-issuing country in the 
                                                 
82 The current crisis itself is a reminder that building liquid markets in a new, novel asset is not something 
that occurs overnight.   44
global economy was unusually small.  So it was that the United States came to account 
for some 75 per cent of global current account deficits.  With the U.S., the euro area and 
China all issuing reserves (to reveal the identities of my three plausible candidates for 
reserve center status 20 years from now), such imbalances would be less.  Given the 
existence of alternatives, an issuer prone to excessive deficits would quickly see other 
countries accumulating reserves in currencies other than its own.  That, in turn, would be 
a source of external discipline.            
This, I have argued elsewhere, is the direction we are heading.
83 The euro’s share 
of global reserves has risen since the new European currency was created in 1999.  And 
Chinese officials have clearly mounted a campaign to transform the renminbi into an 
international currency, encouraging domestic and foreign firms to settle their transactions 
in renminbi, signing agreements with foreign governments to do likewise, extending 
renminbi swaps to foreign central banks, and relaxing restrictions on the ability of foreign 
financial institutions to issue renminbi debt in Hong Kong.   
But, again, the euro and the renminbi will match the dollar as an attractive form of 
reserves only when they possess equally deep and liquid markets. The market in U.S. 
treasury debt remains far and away the most liquid in the world.  Europe and China may 
eventually succeed in creating equally liquid markets in debt securities denominated in 
their currencies, but the relevant time frame is measured in decades, not years.  Europe’s 
problem is that the stock of government debt securities is not homogeneous.  Different 
government bonds differ in their risk, returns and liquidity.  German bunds have a 
reputation for stability, but since they tend to be held to maturity by institutional investors 
the market in them lacks liquidity.  Other euro area countries with plenty of bonds have 
                                                 
83 See Eichengreen (2009d).   45
deep financial problems as a result of past policies and the crisis.  Italian government 
bonds are in fact the most important euro area debt securities by value, but the country’s 
problems mean that they are not attractive as reserve assets.  The crisis has encouraged 
talk of issuing euro area bonds and putting the full faith and credit of the entire set of 
members, starting with Germany, behind them.  Were this done on a significant scale and 
were such debt to replace the national debt securities of the member states, the euro area 
would possess something more closely resembling the U.S. treasury market.  But this 
kind of radical fiscal federalism is not something to which the German government is 
likely to agree anytime soon. 
For the renminbi, an important precondition is full capital account convertibility, 
and even that is only necessary, not a sufficient, for market liquidity.  Chinese officials 
have targeted 2020 as the date by which Shanghai should be transformed into an 
international financial center, meaning that its markets are open to foreign investors free 
of capital-account restrictions.  At that point the process of building truly liquid markets 
can commence.     
Someday we will have a multiple reserve-currency system not unlike the one that 
existed before 1913 that limits the problem of global imbalances. But not tomorrow.    
 
Conclusion 
  Financial crises are complex. Our recent crisis is one such complex event whose 
causes can be broadly grouped under two headings: lax regulation combined with skewed 
incentives in financial markets; and accommodating monetary policy combined with 
global imbalances that fueled an unsustainable housing and credit boom.     46
  That crises rarely have a single cause means that avoiding them can rarely be 
achieved by a single policy reform or set of reforms. This paper has therefore provided 
two lists of reforms designed to address the two sources of instability contributing to our 
recent crisis. Both lists are long. Neither will be easy to implement.  In both cases 
powerful stakeholders will resist reform. In both cases important details remain to be 
worked out.  In both cases the extent of intellectual agreement on what must be done may 
be less deep and broad than I have made out in this paper. 
  Be that as it may, now that the worst of the crisis has passed it is important that 
the sense of urgency attached to reform, and the willingness to collaborate internationally 
in its pursuit, not also be allowed to pass.  47
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